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WATER LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND
BRAZIL—CLIMATE CHANGE & TWO APPROACHES TO
EMERGING WATER POVERTY
DAVID N. CASSUTO & RÔMULO S. R. SAMPAIO*

ABSTRACT
This article examines two of the major water legal regimes in the
Americas—that of Brazil and the United States. Both countries have
extensive wet and dry regions and both hydro-regimes face a significant
threat from global warming. Brazil, for instance, is home to between
eight and fifteen percent of the world’s fresh water, and its fast-growing
economy and population present major challenges in management and
allocation. The U.S. also faces major water allocation problems resulting
from past settlement policies; unsustainable reclamation projects; and
also fast-growing domestic, industrial and agricultural demand.
In the United States, water has traditionally been perceived as a
renewable and limitless resource, a cultural legacy that has exerted a
powerful influence on the nation’s common law. Similarly, in Brazil, the
notion of water as infinitely abundant drove water policies until the
enactment of the Constitution in 1988. In both countries, however,
hydrological realities have become impossible to ignore. Their respective
laws and jurisprudence have begun shifting toward management and
allocation systems that acknowledge the limited nature of the resource.
This article surveys the two countries’ water regimes, offering a
brief history of their evolution and then focusing on the challenges of the
present. It examines how the notion of a strong private property right
in water is slowly (in the North-American case) and more abruptly (in
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the Brazilian case) evolving in the face of increased governmental
intervention.
The article then turns to the challenges of climate change. In
Brazil, policies that fail to take desertification into account may threaten
the country’s energy supply as well as the availability of potable water.
In the United States, ignoring climate change in water management and
allocation policies could significantly increase the existing water scarcity
in the West and exacerbate the growing and already serious water
shortage in the traditionally humid East.
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INTRODUCTION
In an age when man has forgotten his origins and is blind
even to his most essential needs for survival, water along
with other resources has become the victim of his indifference.
–Rachel Carson1
Brazil and the United States face similar hydrological challenges.
Both countries have abundant water that is unevenly distributed.2 Those
water reserves—already unequal to demand in some regions—are forecast to diminish considerably in coming years due to climate change.3
The respective water law regimes of the two nations are also in flux.
Brazil enacted significant changes to its laws in recent decades, moving
from a system that allowed private ownership of water to one that treats
water exclusively as a common resource.4 The United States’ laws have
also evolved, from strict riparian and prior appropriation regimes (in the
East and West, respectively) to permitting systems that are more cognizant of both shortage and the need for regulatory oversight.5
1

RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 39 (40th Anniversary ed. 2002).
See Thomas Brown et al., Spacial Distribution of Water Supply in the Coterminous
United States, 44 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 1474, 1484–85 app. tbl.A.2 (2008), available
at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/docs/spatial_distribution_water_supply.pdf; Roberto Luiz
do Carmo, Population and Water Resources in Brazil, in NÚCLEO DE ESTUDOS DE
POPULAÇÃO, POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT IN BRAZIL: RIO + 10 168, 169, 171, tbl.1
(2002), available at http://www.nepo.unicamp.br/textos/publicacoes/livros/rio+10/
rio10p167a182.pdf; and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO],
Review of World Water Resources by Country, WATER REPORT 23, at 22 (2003), available
at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4473E/y4473e00.htm.
3
See Z.W. Kundzewicz et al., Freshwater Resources and their Management, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY—CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 175 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts
_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm.
4
See Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil’s Water Law: Encouraging Sound
Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L.
147, 175 (2006).
5
See Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 403, 405–13 (2009).
2
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Nevertheless, daunting challenges remain. Brazil’s regulatory
apparatus is ill-equipped to enforce its laws, and the nation’s dependence
on hydroelectricity makes it difficult to put the underlying principles of
precaution, equity, and multiple use into practice. In the United States,
despite the increased use of permitting, water rights remain privately held
even as the water itself is a public good. This makes for a legal thicket and
a rigid system wherein private rights can trump public needs and structural
adaptation gets hindered by unsustainable preexisting arrangements.
This article argues that the challenges faced by the two countries,
while different, are based on similar geographical realities. Thus, the
solutions required must be similar as well. Although the two legal systems differ (Brazil is a civil law country while the United States employs
common law), there is much overlap. The United States would do well to
study the adaptability and flexibility built into modern Brazilian water
law. Brazil could in turn benefit by analyzing how the United States has
managed to effectively enforce its laws despite a large land area and
varying geography.
Part I of this article surveys the United States’ water legal system,
reviewing the riparian laws of the eastern U.S. and the prior appropriation scheme of the West. It looks at the way the two systems incorporate
the concept of water as a public good while allowing significant property
rights in water. It then describes how both the East and West have
slowly transitioned toward permitting while still retaining significant
vestiges of the prior regimes. This section then looks briefly at the limitations of the two systems and their incompatibility with forecasted
climate-related hydrological shifts.
Part II examines the Brazilian water regime. It looks first at the
private property era that preceded the 1988 Constitution and then tracks
the evolution of the modern Brazilian system that treats water as a
resource common to all. It analyzes in some detail the post-1988 permitting system created by the National Water Management Act and discusses the enforcement challenges presented by the new regime.
The final part looks at the looming challenges presented by
climate change and the differing but related problems that the two
countries face in adapting to a water-scarce reality. There is no panacea
for Brazil, the United States, or any other nation. However, even as the
world attempts to diminish the severity of anthropogenically-caused
climatic shifts, some significant changes are inevitable. Water shortages
will occur (indeed, they are already occurring) and will grow more severe
over time. Water laws must acknowledge and compensate for these losses

2011]

WATER LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

375

while continuing to equitably divide what remains and enable universal
access. These are not small challenges and the regimes of both countries
will require significant retrofitting before they can hope to manage the
task. It is our hope that this comparative study will help facilitate that
process in both countries.
I.

THE AMERICAN WATER LEGAL REGIME

Water in the United States is considered a “public good.”6 Public
goods are indivisible, public and free.7 This means that they cannot be
divided or sold and that all people have the right of access without cost
(excluding those costs associated with “capture, transportation, and
delivery”).8 There are characteristics of the American water regime that
cast doubt on this classification, but, in the main, the term “public good”
remains a useful descriptor.9 Privately held water rights confer rights of
use; they do not convey actual legal title to the water.10 Furthermore, no
one can prevent members of the public from accessing and enjoying
water regardless of the seniority of one’s water right.11 The reasons for
this are partly biological. Because water is biologically critical, the state
has an obligation to provide access for its citizenry.12
6

Cf. HENRY P. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 9–10, 113, 113b
(1904); Bill Staudenmaier, Water and the Law: A Guide to What Matters, 15 BUS. L.
TODAY 13, 16 (2006).
7
A public good offers a tangible correlative to the Brazilian concept of a “diffused right”
which refers to a right that is common to all people and indivisible. See Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
539, 545 (2004); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 81, I. (Braz.); see also CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL
[C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
8
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 545.
9
For example, water can be exclusively owned in small amounts (the most common
example being bottled water) and water rights provide a means of controlling access. See
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 549. However, outside of de
minimis amounts, water rights are usufructuary and that fact alone militates for their
classification as a public rather than a private good. See Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at
16; see also Gustavo Capdevila, UN Consecrates Water as Public Good, Human Right,
INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 27, 2002), http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp
?idnews=14204.
10
But see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 240–41
(1954); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F. 3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Alameda Gateway, Ltd. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 757 (1999); Store Safe Redlands
Assocs. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726 (1996).
11
Cf. FARNHAM, supra note 6, at §§ 23, 113b; Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 16.
12
See Capdevila, supra note 9, at 546.
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Because all can access public goods without cost, they are not
responsive to market pressures. For example, broadcast frequencies are
available to anyone with the proper equipment (i.e., a radio, a TV or
internet access).13 One cannot effectively control or charge for access;
there will always be “free riders.”14 Consequently, there exists no incentive
on the part of users to invest in the maintenance or betterment of the
resource.15 As a result, regulation—not the market—provides the most
effective means of managing public goods.16 Water’s unique status creates
further regulatory complications as well. For example, the fact that water
rights provide for (and the market values) rights of access and control
adds complexity to the legal regime governing its allocation and use.
The American water law regime arose from pre-industrial English
common law and began with the common law of riparianism. Riparian
rights, in their pure form, allowed owners of land adjoining a body of
water to make unrestricted use of that water.17 As the United States
expanded to the semi-arid western territories, a different “prior appropriation” water regime evolved.18 Today, with a few exceptions (states in
which both systems co-exist), the country is divided into versions of
riparian legal regimes in the East and prior appropriation schemes in the
West. The dividing line (more or less) is the 100th meridian, west of
which annual rainfall tallies drop precipitously.19 For the most part, state
law governs water management and allocation.20 However, there are

13

See 47 U.S.C.§§ 151, 254(c)(1) (2006); see also Frequently Asked Questions, DTV.GOV,
http://ww.dtv.gov/consumercorner .html#faq6. (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
14
Other examples of public goods include clean air, lighthouses, public roadways and the
like. See Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 546; John K. Setear, An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations and International
Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 139, 174–75 (1996); Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local
Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 13 n.26,
14 n.27 (2004).
15
See Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 546.
16
See id. (discussing restrictions on riparian rights); e.g., Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9–10 (1960) (illustrating how the private property system
can be the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources).
17
Cf. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 555–56 (discussing the few
restrictions on riparian rights).
18
See Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 15.
19
See Reed D. Benson, Rivers to Live By: Can Western Water Law Help Communities
Embrace Their Streams?, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 n. 8 (2007); see Klein
et al., supra note 5, at 406; see also JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE
ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF
UTAH 46-56 (Govt. Printing Office 1879).
20
Cf. Klein et al., supra note 5, at 419.
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federal water laws (regarding, e.g., endangered species,21 interstate
rivers,22 navigation,23 reserved rights for federal land,24 and Native American Reservations25) that interact with and can preempt state laws.26
As already noted, the American regime accommodates both
private and public interests in water. The market-based allocation
policies guiding the settlement of the West,27 however, increased consumption levels and imposed significant use pressures upon water
reserves.28 Growing demand led to more stringent regulation, which led
to greater litigation as tensions between market allocation and regulatory schemes became inevitable.29 The resulting systems of law in both
21

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); see generally David N.
Cassuto & Steven M. Reed, Water Law and the Endangered Species Act (July 28, 2010),
in WHOSE DROPS IS IT ANYWAY?: EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF OUR NATION’S WATER
RESOURCES (Megan Baroni ed., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1650241.
22
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183–85 (1982) (discussing the federal common law
doctrine of equitable apportionment); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 627–30 (1945);
Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629–631 (5th Cir. 2009).
23
See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991); Alameda Gateway, Ltd. v.
United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 757 (1999); see also Jennifer L. Chapman, Note, Navigable
Purpose? Prove It. Rethinking the Role of the Navigational Servitude in Regulatory
Takings Claims After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 35 GA. L. REV. 1195,
1195–97 (2001); Benjamin Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the Foreshore”:
The Federal Navigational Servitude and its Origins in State Public Trust Doctrine, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 471, 471 (2002).
24
See Heather Blomfield Lee, Note, Forcing the Federal Hand: Reserved Water Rights v.
States’ Rights for Instream Protection, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1271, 1271–72 (1990).
25
See Liana Gregory, Note, “Technically Open”: The Debate Over Native American
Reserved Groundwater Rights, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 361, 361–62 (2008);
see also Nicole C. Salamander, A Half Full Circle: The Reserved Rights Doctrine and
Tribal Reacquired Lands, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 333, 334, 342 (2009).
26
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Hawaiian Navigable Waters Pres. Soc’y v.
Hawaii, 823 F.Supp. 766 (D. Haw. 1993) (discussing preemption of federal laws regarding
navigation of ocean water surrounding Hawaii).
27
See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers
and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 362 (2005) (discussing the homestead
movement: “Congress enacted a series of measures to ‘privatize’ or otherwise dispose of
much of the public domain east of the Mississippi River.”).
28
See Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 15 (“[T]he population of most western states has
grown steadily for more than a century as limited water supplies have been harnessed
and made available for agriculture, municipal and industrial uses.”); see also Stephen N.
Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 723, 724 (2009). See generally LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM
RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
AMERICAN WEST (2000).
29
See Ginette Chapman, Note, From Toilet to Tap: The Growing Use of Reclaimed Water
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riparian and prior appropriation states evolved over time to address
population pressures and ongoing issues of scarcity. However, it remains
inflexible and ill-equipped to deal with the hydrological realities forecasted for the coming decades as climate change alters patterns of rainfall and ambient temperatures. What follows is a brief description of the
water law regimes in the eastern and western United States.
A.

Riparian Rights

Riparianism is based on the English common law and, over time,
became the governing law of the eastern United States.30 Only landowners whose property borders a river, stream or lake are permitted to make
use of the water.31 Under the traditional “natural flow” doctrine,32 each
riparian is entitled to receive water of undiminished quality and quantity.33 Furthermore, since water rights inhere in riparian property rights,
they are not dependent on use.34 A riparian landowner could elect to not
exercise her water right for years without any penalty.35

and the Legal System’s Response, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 773–76 (2005) (stating that
“[s]tricter water quality standards, improved treatment technology, and growing demand
for water have led to an upsurge in the reuse of wastewater to meet a variety of
municipal, residential, agricultural, commercial, and environmental needs.”); David S.
Baron, Water Quality Standards for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
559, 559 (1995); Robert Vitale, Privatizing Water Systems: A Primer, 24 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1382, 1385–86 (2001).
30
Riparian doctrine remains the law in some form in thirty-one states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Peter N. Davis, Law and Fact Patterns in Common Law Water Pollution Cases, 1 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 4 nn.20–22 (1993).
31
Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 15. Indeed, the term riparian derives from the Latin
word “ripa,” meaning riverbank. Conflicts among water users are as old as language
itself, as one can see from the term “rival,” derived from the term “rivalis,” which refers
to one using the same stream as another. DAVID N. CASSUTO, DRIPPING DRY: LITERATURE,
POLITICS, AND WATER IN THE DESERT SOUTHWEST 149 n.2 (2004).
32
The “natural flow” doctrine states that “each riparian proprietor on a watercourse is
entitled to have the stream flow through the land in its natural condition, without other
users perceptibly retarding, diminishing, or polluting the flow.” Richard Ausness, The
Distribution of Water Rights: Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection
of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 416 (1986).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 416–17.
35
See generally Lynn B. Squires, Unused Riparian Water Rights in Washington—Department
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Natural Flow vs. Reasonable Use

Over time, as the American population grew and industrial uses
of water became prevalent, the natural flow doctrine became increasingly
unworkable.36 Off-stream uses, necessary to sustain America’s growing
agricultural and industrial demands, proliferated.37 In addition, differences in natural landscape, geographical context, and population density
between the United States and the United Kingdom, meant that riparian
doctrine had to evolve to meet the needs of the American landscape. The
milestone case reflecting that evolution, Tyler v. Wilkinson,38 introduced
the notion of “reasonable use.” Wilkinson held that riparians could use
water in ways that diminished quantity and quality, so long as that use
was “reasonable.”39
Under the reasonable use rule, riparian landowners apply their
collective and individual judgments to determine what uses are and are
not reasonable. Courts intervene only when conflicts become irreconcilable.40 At such times, courts must decide which among the competing
uses is the more reasonable. While criteria for reasonableness vary from
state to state, all agree that domestic uses take precedence.41 Amongst
non-domestic uses, however, it is less easy to predict how a court will
determine which uses are the most reasonable.42 Furthermore, riparian
of Ecology v. Abbott, 103 WN.2D 686, 694 P.2D 1071 (1985), 60 WASH L. REV. 787, 801–03
(1985). Note that abandonment and forfeiture are not easily established under governing
legal standards.
36
See Ausness, supra note 32, at 417–18.
37
Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 13 (“Approximately 48 percent of all water used in the
United States in 2000, more than 195 billion gallons per day, was used to generate
electricity. Agriculture is the second largest water user in the United States, consuming
approximately 34 percent of all water used in 2000, followed by municipal and industrial
uses, which totaled approximately 16 percent of water consumption.”).
38
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F.Cas. 472 (C.C.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
39
Id.
40
Ausness, supra note 32, at 417–18.
41
See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Ark. 1955); see also, Joseph W. Dellapenna,
The Right to Consume Water under “Pure” Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS §§ 7.03–7.03(e) (Robert E. Beck ed., 2009).
42
See Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 559. Factors for
determining use priority include:
a) Purpose of use,
b) Suitability of the use to the water source,
c) Economic value of the use,
d) Social value of the use,
e) Extent and amount of the harm it causes,
f) Practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or method
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doctrine in its pure form does not adequately account for the needs of
municipalities43 and has a built in bias against smaller users who are
less able to litigate or organize against larger users’ unreasonable usage
of the available water.44 As a result of all these factors, riparian doctrine
has evolved to become more statutory and regulated (discussed below).45
In addition, many states have enacted statutes giving priority to uses
including municipal needs, irrigation, and hydropower.46
2.

Shifting from Riparianism to an Administrative Permit System

Increasing demand for water and the intensification of droughts,
along with skepticism regarding the efficiency of the common law in
addressing water allocations have challenged the responsiveness of
riparian doctrine.47 As a result, a more proactive managerial system
emerged, commonly known as “regulated riparianism.”48 Regulated
riparianism is based on a comprehensive administrative permit system
and has been adopted by eighteen states.49
of use of one or the other of the disputants,
Practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by the
respective disputants,
h) Protection of existing value of water, land, investments and
enterprises,
i) Justice of requiring the user ostensibly causing the harm to bear
the loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1982); see Rebecca Sugerman, The Mojave
Basin Physical Solution: It’s a Good Idea, but is it Good Law?, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 307, 320 (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 cmt.
b (1979) (rejecting the concept of absolute prohibition of non-riparian uses and
acknowledging that the most economic use of the water be off-tract for mining,
agriculture, manufacturing, etc.); Gregory J. Hobbs, Priority: The Most Misunderstood
Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 43–44 (2002). However, the Restatement rule
retains the requirement that users own some riparian land (albeit even a square foot) to
use the water. This approach has been adopted in a number of states, including Georgia,
Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Vermont. See Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (Ga. 1980), overruled by Tunison
v. Harper, 690 S.E.2d 819 (2010); see generally Christopher L. Len, Synthesis—A Brand
New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER. L. REV. 55, 90–92 (2004).
43
See generally Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian
Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 95, 102–03 (1985).
44
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 560.
45
See Len, supra note 42, at 66–70.
46
Hobbs, supra note 42, at 46.
47
See Len, supra note 42, at 69.
48
Id.
49
Those states are (in ascending chronological order): Maryland, Arkansas, Iowa,
g)
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Benefits of regulated riparianism include: efficiency in resource
allocation and conservation incentives (resulting from public management),
stability in designating water rights, and the ability to take proactive
steps prior to any anticipated shortage.50 By contrast, common law
riparianism creates incentives for owners to take as much water as they
possibly can in order to obtain larger portions of the resource. This can
lead to the “tragedy of the commons.”51 Public permit systems work more
equitably in accommodating the interests of competing users and uses.52
By charging for water, administrative permit systems also instill
a conservation ethic (of sorts) among licensees.53 Moreover, while common law riparianism does not quantify the amount of water to which one
is “reasonably” entitled, a managerial regime clearly sets the amount of
water available to permittees.54 It thereby creates a much more stable
environment amongst competing users, beneficially affecting land values
as well as facilitating commerce.55
The downside of this system is that it can be very costly. It requires a bureaucratic apparatus that can be both cumbersome and
resource-intensive.56 Nor does it guarantee fairness in implementation,
as administrative judgments can be both arbitrary and biased.57 Further-

Wisconsin, Delaware, New Jersey, Kentucky, North Carolina, Florida, Minnesota,
Georgia, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Hawaii, Virginia, and
Alabama. See Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 7, at 584–85.
50
See Ling-Yee Huang, Fifth Amendment Takings & Transitions in Water Law:
Compensation (Just) for the Environment, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 49, 65 (2007). See
also Len, supra note 42, at 69–70; Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, “Permit” Me Another Drink:
A Proposal for Safeguarding Water Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian
East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 414–16 (2005).
51
See JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
GOVERNANCE 10 (2d. ed. 2000).
52
See Butler, supra note 43, at 156–58; Joseph. W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water
Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 34–35 (2002).
53
See Barton H. Thompson, Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 756–57 (1993).
54
Id. at 697.
55
See id. at 717–18.
56
See Funding Topics, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/nav/nav.cfm
?loc=t&id=103 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011), and State Water Agencies, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB.
H E A L T H & E N V ’ T , h t t p : / / w w w . c d p h e . s t a t e . c o . u s / o p/wq cc/Ge ne ral I nfo /
StateWaterAgencies.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011), for a list and description of water
resource agencies in each state.
57
Robert Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East:
Considering a Move Away From Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 255, 264–65 (1990).
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more, cultural resistance to regulation,58 as well as entrenched suspicion
of government interference in water allocation,59 helps explain why
resistance to regulation continues even in the face of worsening water
shortages and heightened conflict. That resistance and continuing struggle to adapt the common law of water to modern society are not limited
to the Eastern United States. In the West, the prior appropriation system has also faced adaptive struggles, as the next section makes clear.
B.

The Prior Appropriation Regime

After the Civil War, American policy turned toward settling the
West,60 where the climate becomes steadily more arid before reaching a
narrow humid zone along the Pacific Coast.61 Initially, settlers attempted
to adapt riparian laws to the western territories.62 However, the region’s
aridity made riparian land comparatively scarce even as mining and
agricultural settlements increased the demand for water. Problems of
shortage and allocation soon arose.63
It became evident that the common law of riparianism was not
practical in an arid region where much of the land was publicly owned64
(those occupying federal land did not own their holdings, thus making
riparian rights unattainable).65 In addition, mining claims had already
established a common law of appropriation based on the same principle
as those used in staking mining claims: first in time, first in right.66
Settlers established local water management and allocation authorities,
which were then taken over by the government at the beginning of the
twentieth century.67 The federal government explicitly recognized prior

58

See Thompson, supra note 53, at 753.
See id.
60
See Thorson et al., supra note 27, at 378.
61
See The United States: Bioclimatic Regions, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/616563/United-States/77962/The-bioclimatic-regions
(last visited Feb. 6, 2011)
62
See Thorson et al., supra note 27, at 378–79.
63
Id. at 378.
64
The vast amount of public landholdings resulted from the Louisiana Purchase as well
as cessions by Mexico. See generally ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN
EXPANSIONISM AND THE EMPIRE OF RIGHT (1996).
65
See Thorson et al., supra note 27, at 379.
66
Id.; JOHN A. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WATER IN THE WEST 18 (W. Network ed. 1983) (the author
adds that “development has an important effect on western water resources . . . .”).
67
Thorson et al., supra note 27, at 379.
59
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appropriation in the 1866 Mining Act,68 the 1877 Desert Land Sales Act,69
and through the judiciary in numerous cases.70
Put simply, prior appropriation means that the first person (or
entity) to divert water from a water source and put that water to beneficial use has a senior and superior right to all subsequent appropriators.
There is no requirement of reasonable use.71 Junior appropriators whose
diversions disappear during times of shortage are simply out of luck.72
For purposes of determining seniority, the date on which the appropriator
started the diversion project by taking the “first step”73 establishes her
place in line. More recently, in most states priority date is established
through a permit system and the right is perfected by completion of the
permit process.74
By requiring that perfected rights make beneficial use of water,
prior appropriation doctrine quantifies uses among all appropriators.
Furthermore, if an appropriator wishes to increase her diversion, she
must go through another appropriation and permit process.75 That
additional right will be junior to all other appropriations completed prior
to the date of the new appropriation.76
1.

Diversion, Beneficial Use, and Appurtenance

Two important terms in the doctrine of prior appropriation are
“diversion” and “beneficial use.”77 Until recently, all prior appropriation
states required that water be actually diverted from the stream (or other
water source) in order for a water right to be perfected.78 As streams
68

30 U.S.C. § 28 (2006).
43 U.S.C. § 641 (2006).
70
See Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 15 (quoting Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872));
Hewitt v. Story, 64 F. 510, 520 (9th Cir. 1894); see also Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536,
540–45 (D. N.M. 1923).
71
John C. Ruple & Robert B. Keiter, Water for Commercial Oil Shale Development in
Utah: Allocating Scarce Resources and the Search for New Sources of Supply, 30 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 95, 116 (2010).
72
Id. at 97.
73
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02(b) (Robert E. Beck et al., eds., 1991).
74
Id. Colorado, however, remains a pure prior appropriation state. It does not have a permit
system. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (eliminating common law
reliance on traditional riparian water rights as a result of Colorado’s lack of water resources).
75
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 73, at § 12.02(b).
76
Id. at § 12.02(c).
77
Id.
78
Id. at § 12.02(c)(1).
69
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became fully appropriated, problems relating to lack of instream flow
came increasingly to the fore.79 As environmental sensitivity has grown,
claims to instream flow have enjoyed growing judicial and statutory recognition.80 There remain, however, a number of states where the concept
still has little or no legal purchase.81
Even assuming a water right meets all other criteria for legal
recognition, the claimed water must still be put to beneficial use.82 Beneficial uses can comprise practically any productive use, including domestic, municipal, agricultural, and industrial functions. The only caveat is
that the uses must not be “wasteful.”83 Standards for what constitute
waste vary by region, but in general, the law assumes that appropriators
will not use water in ways that cause more loss than is typical.84 This
leaves room for considerable variability in efficiency depending on the
region’s wealth and geography.85
79

See Cassuto & Reed, supra note 21, at 16.
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 46.15.030 (West 1982) (claims “reserved to the people” of
Alaska so long as beneficial uses are sought); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (West 2008)
(claims can be based on municipal purposes, including recreational, piscatorial, fishery,
wildlife, and other beneficial uses); see also Board of County Comm’rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d
546 (Colo. 1992); Matter of Applications for Water Rights, 838 P.2d 840, 853–54 (Colo.
1992) (discussing what constitutes minimum instream flow); Central Platte Nat’l Res.
Dist. v. State of Wyoming, 513 N.W.2d 847, 855 (Neb. 1994) (historical flow rates used
to determine ecological effects of instream flows).
81
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(1)(a)–(b) (2009) (private appropriator must
“divert, impound or withdraw”). Some states, including California continue to require
diversion. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816,
819–20 (1979).
82
See Thorson et al., supra note 27, at 414.
83
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(B (1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.035 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (West 2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-8 (2010); see also Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest
Pipeline Operating Co., 98 P.3d 1 (Utah 2004) (holding that irrigation of natural trees
and vegetation may be a beneficial use but cautioning that this holding should not be
interpreted as implying that the irrigation of natural vegetation is a beneficial use in
general and may in fact be nonbeneficial and wasteful depending upon the particular
facts and circumstances); Neubert v. Yakima-Tieton Irrigation Dist., 814 P.2d 199, 2003
(Wash. 1991) (frost prevention to crops is beneficial use); A. Dan Tarlock, The Changing
Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 NEB. L. REV. 145, 156 (1987).
84
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 73, § 12.02(c)(2).
85
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01(1) (West 2009) (“‘Beneficial use’ means a use of water
for a purpose consistent with the best interests of the people of the state.”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 533.030(2) (West 2009) (“The use of water, from any stream system as
provided in this chapter and from underground water as provided in NRS 534.080, for
any recreational purpose, . . . is hereby declared to be a beneficial use.”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 85-2-102(4) (2009).
80
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Another basic concept of the prior appropriation regime is that the
right to appropriate water designates its use and therefore is constrained
to a specific location where the water will be beneficially used.86 This
appurtenance limitation is not absolute. Certain jurisdictions allow for
the “severance and transfer” so long as it does not interfere with other
water users.87
2.

Limitations

As in riparian jurisdictions, water rights under prior appropriation are solely usufructuary.88 Users do not own the water and uses are
subject to limitations arising from conflicting governmental uses (municipal, state and federal, including interstate compacts).89 As with riparian
rights, post-hoc limitations on water rights may be subject to compensation
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.90 Many prior appropriation
states have enacted statutes that base permitting decisions on criteria
that include the public interest, but such statutes do not apply to already
existing appropriative rights.91 The simple hydrological truth of the matter
is that most water in the western United States was appropriated long
‘Beneficial use,’ unless otherwise provided, means (a) a use of water for
the benefit of the appropriator, other persons, or the public, including
but not limited to agricultural, stock water, domestic, fish and wildlife,
industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and recreational uses;
(b) a use of water appropriated by the department for the state water
leasing program under 85-2-141; (c) a use of water by the department
of fish, wildlife, and parks through a change in an appropriation right
for instream flow to protect, maintain, or enhance streamflows to
benefit the fishery resource authorized under 85-2-436; (d) a use of
water through a temporary change in appropriation right or lease to
enhance instream flow to benefit the fishery resource in accordance
with 85-2-408; (e) a use of water for aquifer storage and recovery
project as provided in 85-2-368. Id.
86
Staudenmaier, supra note 6, at 16.
87
Id.
88
Cassuto & Reed, supra note 21, at 26–27.
89
Id. at 14–15.
90
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (holding that “the extent . . . that the federal
government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the water to which they would otherwise
have been entitled, have rendered the usufructuary right to that water valueless, they
have thus effected a physical taking.”); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543
F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Bureau of Reclamation’s diversion of water for fish
ladder amounted to a taking); Cassuto & Reed, supra note 21.
91
See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
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ago.92 Moreover, a unique limitation on the prior appropriation regime
is that, unlike in traditional riparian jurisdictions, water rights are
subject to forfeiture,93 though successfully making such cases remains
very difficult.94
Over time, the complexity of the prior appropriation regime has
caused—in all states save Colorado, which remains a “pure” prior appropriation state—an evolution to a state-administered system based on
water codes (laws and regulations) and permitting.95 Though permitting
reduces the threat of caprice and hegemony over access to water by
delegating to government officials the responsibility for determining
whether unappropriated water exists and whether a proposed use is
beneficial, the system’s byzantine complexity still remains.96 More
problematic still is the fact that the basis of the doctrine—first in time,
first in right—allows little flexibility in the face of changing hydrological
realities. It also aggregates control over the resource to comparatively
few people. This rigidity does not bode well as the geographical shifts
accompanying climate change begin taking hold in earnest.
C.

Groundwater Is Legally Separate

For reasons having little to do with hydrology and much to do
with entrenched common-law assumptions, American law treats groundwater as separate from surface water,97 and the various states have
developed several different legal regimes for the management of groundwater.98 In addition, the law distinguishes between groundwater flowing
in a defined underground stream and groundwater percolating without

92

See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920-22 (1998).
93
Under contemporary riparian law, it is possible for riparian right-holders to forfeit
their rights through non-use. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 73, §§
17.03(a) & (b).
94
See City of Union Gap v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 195 P.3d 580, 584 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2008) (narrowly construing forfeiture actions under Washington State statute in
favor of uses beneficial to the owner of a water right).
95
WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 37 (2d ed. 1989).
96
See id. at 37–39, for a discussion of the permitting and challenge process; see also Scott
S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free Trade Era: As Strong as Ever,
53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 668–75 (2007).
97
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 858 cmt. c (1979).
98
Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities for
Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 341, 354 (2000).
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a defined path.99 Groundwater in a defined stream gets treated much the
same as surface water.100 For the latter, however, one of five possible
analytical frameworks apply: absolute ownership, American reasonable
use, correlative rights, Restatement (Second) of Torts reasonable use,
and prior appropriation.101 These doctrines resemble surface water doctrines in some respects, but with important differences.
The doctrine of absolute ownership applies the law of capture to
the groundwater—whoever captures the water has the rights over it.102
The American reasonable use approach modifies absolute ownership by
requiring that captured water be put to reasonable use on the overlying
tract.103 Correlative rights mandate that groundwater be equitably shared
among overlying landowners,104 while the Restatement (Second) of Torts
approach imposes liability upon those who unreasonably draw down the
aquifer’s level.105 Finally, the prior appropriation doctrine mirrors the
surface water doctrine of first in time, first in right.106
II.

THE BRAZILIAN WATER LEGAL REGIME

The Brazilian and United States water law systems resemble each
other in many respects. Both are based on the principle that water is a
public resource managed by the state and held in trust for the people.
This doctrine, derived from Roman law,107 and known in the United
States as the Public Trust Doctrine,108 is found in Article 225 of the 1988
99

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, supra note 97, at cmt. c.
Id.
101
3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 23 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
102
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS , supra note 97, at cmt. b.
103
3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 101.
104
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS , supra note 97, at cmt. c.
105
Id. at cmt. e.
106
Anne J. Castle, Water Rights Law-Prior Appropriation, FINDLAW, (Jan. 1, 1999),
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/241492.html; 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 73, § 12.02(b).
107
See CID TOMANIK POMPEU, DIREITO DE ÁGUAS NO BRASIL 40 [WATER LAW IN BRAZIL]
(Revista dos Tribunais, 2006) (Braz.) (describing the origins of the Brazilian Water Legal
framework in light of a historical division of water legal systems into dry and wet regions.
The Brazilian Water Legal framework is based on the Roman Law of wet regions).
108
See Dean Baxtresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming
Age of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 790 (2010) (noting that the public
trust doctrine is confusing and describing it as follows: “[w]hen a state holds a resource
which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self100
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Brazilian Constitution. Article 225 states that the “environment . . . is an
asset of common use.”109 No one owns it and all people shall have equal
and unfettered access to it.110 Water Law n. 9.433 (enacted in 1997)
codifies this principle by declaring water to be an asset within the public
domain.111 Article 98 of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code provides further
clarity, stating that resources within the public domain are public
assets.112 This constitutional and statutory combination places water
solidly within the legal category of public assets of common use.
A.

Evolution of Brazilian Water Law

The classification of all waters as a public good is a relatively new
phenomenon in Brazil.113 Portuguese law, whose remnants can still be found
in Brazilian law, allowed private ownership of water. Since its discovery
in 1500,114 Brazil has had six Constitutions prior to 1988 (1824, 1891, 1934,
1937, 1946, and 1967).115 Prior to the 1988 Constitution, federal and/or
interest of private parties.”).
109
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.). For an unofficial
English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see Brazil: 1988 Constitution with
1996 Reforms, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, http://
pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html (last updated Nov. 2008).
110
Equal access is construed in Brazilian law according to the principle of isonomy, which
allows for differing capacities, needs and uses to dictate water management and
allocation policies. See Odilon Castello Borges Neto, Is the State Action Requirement
Really Necessary?: A Comparative Study Between the American and the Brazilian System
of Fundamental Rights Protection, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 805, 808, 858–59, & n.169 (2006).
111
See Lei No. 9.433, de 8 de Janeiro de 1997, DIARO OFICIAL DE UNIAO [D.O.U.] art. 1,
I, de 9.1.1997 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9433.htm.
112
See C.C. art. 98 & 99, I (Braz.), available at http://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/
L10406.htm.
113
See Paulo Jose Leite Farias, Brazil: The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water,
in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 69, 73 (Joseph W. Dellapenna &
Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009) (noting that under the 1934 Water Code, water was classified
as “public, common and private.”).
114
The Portuguese expedition fleet was led by Pedro Álvares Cabral and first arrived in
the Brazilian town of Porto Seguro, Bahia State, on April 21, 1500. See generally JOÃO
CAPISTRANO DE ABREU, CAPÍTULOS DE HISTÓRIA COLONIAL [CHAPTERS OF COLONIAL
HISTORY] 12–14 (1928) (detailing the history behind the Portuguese expedition led by
Pedro Alvares Cabral, the first one arriving in Brazil).
115
The Brazilian Constitutions were enacted in chronological order as follows: March 25,
1824; February 24, 1891; July 16, 1934; November 10, 1937; September 18, 1946;
January 1, 1967 and October 5, 1988. See generally JOSE AFONSO DA SILVA, CURSO DE
DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL POSITIVO [POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE] 69–90
(Malheiros Editores 1976) (2008) (Braz.) (detailing the political and constitutional history
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state governments were tasked with managing water resources but
private ownership was still permissible.116 The 1916 Civil Code117 and
1934 Water Code118 continued this tradition. In 1981, the National
Environmental Policy Act inaugurated a more environmentally-oriented
water management phase, complemented and enhanced by the 1988
Constitution and Law no. 9.433.119 It was not until 1988, when the
enactment of the 1988 Constitution banned all private rights over water

and evolution in Brazil). See also Presidencia da Republica, Casa Civil, Subchefia para
Assuntos Juridicos, the official Brazilian Executive Power website, which provides a
Portuguese version of all Constitutions, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/
principal.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
116
See POMPEU, supra note 107, at 41–45 (describing the water legal regime in each
Brazilian Constitution since 1824).
117
See Arlindo Daibert, Historical Views on Environment and Environmental Law in
Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 779, 823 (2009) (noting, in general, that the 1916
Brazilian Civil Code “played a pioneering role in Brazilian environmental law, similar
to the role that the case law on torts has played in the evolution of the U.S.
environmental legal system”).
118
Id. at 825–26.
Decreto Number 24,463 promulgated the Code of Waters (Codigo de
Aguas), the stated purpose of which was, among others, to ‘change the
state of affairs, endowing the country with an adequate legislation that,
in accordance with the contemporary trend, may permit control by the
public power and promote the use of industrial waters.’ The code
classified waters, according to who ‘owned’ them, as public, common
and private. Id.
119
See Antonio Herman Benjamin et al., The Water Giant Awakes: An Overview of Water
Law in Brazil, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2185, 2193–94 (2005).
The legal regime for water continued without major changes until 1981,
when the National Environmental Policy Act was promulgated. This
Act recognized for the first time water’s environmental value. A few
years later, the Assembleia Nacional Constituinte (National
Constitutional Assembly) elaborated a new constitution that
symbolized the end of the military regime installed in 1964. At the end
of the 1990’s, a set of new laws was enacted. Among them was the 1997
Lei da Politica Nacional dos Recursos Hidricos (National Water Act),
for whose implementation the Agencia Nacional de Aguas (National
Water Agency or ANA) was subsequently created. These laws signaled
a departure from the 1934 Code’s vision of water as an inexhaustible,
power-generating resource. The National Environmental Policy Act
defines environmental resources as: the atmosphere; internal waters,
both surface and underground; estuaries; the territorial sea; the soil
and the subsoil; and fauna and flora. Id.
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resources,120 that that the laws of water allocation and ownership took
their current form.121
Because of the importance of the shift from private ownership to
an exclusively public regime that recognizes water as an asset of common
use indispensable to a healthy life and ecologically balanced environment,122 our analysis of Brazilian water law is divided into two main
sections: pre and post-1988 Constitution. During the post-1988 regime,
Brazilian water law has also had to shift from a time of water abundance
(when allocation decisions did not have to account for socioeconomic and
demographic pressures) to the current era of periodic shortages, use
pressures, and policymakers struggling to implement laws and regulations already in place.123 Growing water scarcity resulting from poor
environmental management,124 natural catastrophes (including climate
change),125 and burgeoning population and water treatment issues126 has
made compliance and enforcement a priority at every governmental level.
As with the United States,127 the urgency of the problems related to fresh
120

Id. at 2194 (“The current model of water management laws certainly would be
unrecognizable to the crafters of the 1916 Civil Code, not only because of the current
model’s rejection of private water ownership, but also and principally because it is based
on new concepts like the user-pays principle, water basin committees, participatory
management, and ecological concerns.”).
121
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20, 3, 4, 5, & 6, and art. 26, 1, 2,
& 3 (Braz.) (describing waters that are held in trust by the federal and state governments).
122
See Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2195 (“The Federal Constitution of 1988 marks
the end of the 1934 Water Code’s private ownership system and (following the example of
the Constitution of 1967) the elimination of its provision for municipal river ownership.”).
123
See McNallen, supra note 4, at 175–76 (identifying implementation problems
associated to the new water legal regime).
124
See id. at 173–74.
125
WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 49 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report
_synthesis_report.htm [hereinafter IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT] (“Climate change
is expected to exacerbate current stresses on water resources from population growth and
economic and land-use change, including urbanisation.”).
126
See McNallen, supra note 4, at 177–78.
127
See Slater, supra note 96, at 668–69.
While state water laws vary and some are far more advanced than
others in their comprehensive approaches, each state employs some
legal methodology and venue to (a) divide limited water resources
between competing water users; (b) provide for consideration of
environmental water needs; and (c) ensure generally that the public
interest is advanced in relation to the state’s water resources. Virtually
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water quantity and quality in Brazil heightens the need for efficient
governmental oversight.128
B.

Water Law Prior to the 1988 Constitution

From the discovery of Brazil in 1500 to its independence in 1822,
the laws governing Brazil were the Portuguese Ordinances of the Kingdom.129 The 1916 Civil Code continued the Portuguese concept of asserting a governmental interest in water only with respect to navigable
bodies of water.130 Even after Brazilian independence131 and under the
Brazilian Constitutional regime of 1824, water rights were defined by
a type of prior appropriation regime that allowed for privately held water

all states prohibit waste and unreasonable use in one form or another.
Typically, the right to continued use of water is secured by compliance
with state laws, including those conditions imposed upon the issuance
of a license or permit, or arising under the common law right, such as
the method and timing of withdrawals, storage, distribution, use and
discharge. Id.
128
McNallen, supra note 4, at 149–50.
Brazil’s National Water Authority (ANA) recently announced that forty
million of Brazil’s 180 million citizens do not have access to treated
drinking water and fifteen million lack drinking water service of any
kind. Even more problematic, sanitary sewage systems capture only
48.9 percent of consumer wastewater produced and only 32 percent of
captured sewage is treated, accounting for 15.6 percent of the total
sewage created by Brazil. The lack of treated water and basic
sanitation accounts for 68 percent of all hospitalizations in Brazil,
costing Brazil’s Ministry of Health over $80 million annually. Id.
129
See Daibert, supra note 117, at 787–91 (providing an overview of environmental
protection under the Portuguese Ordinances of the Kingdom: “The Ordinances were a
mixture of codified prior written sources, compilation of two other older preexisting
codifications, and aggregated royal resolutions, concordats, and national and local
customs previously in force.”).
130
See C.C. art. 563–568, 1.1.1916 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil
_03/Leis/L3071.htm; see also Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Águas—Considerações Gerais
17, 18 [Water—General Considerations], in ÁGUAS ASPECTOS JURIDICOS E AMBEINTAIS
[WATER LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS] (Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Coord.,
Juruá, 2002) (Braz.) (describing the water regime under the 1916 Civil Code). The focus
on a navigability type of approach toward water policy was characterized as a
“navigability phase.” Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2190.
131
See Marcus Faro de Castro & Maria Izabel Valladao de Carvalho, Globalization and
Recent Political Transitions in Brazil, 24 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 465, 467–68 (2003)
(detailing the different political cycles in Brazil, during the 1900s, including the 1964–85
military dictatorship government).
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rights.132 Private ownership was restricted only when it interfered
with navigability.133
1.

Private Ownership of Water

In a time of few demographic pressures, vast areas of available
land, and abundant freshwater, privately held water posed little problem
for the country’s development.134 Only when increasing energy needs
began to jeopardize the country’s economic development did authorities
begin viewing water as a strategic resource. This reevaluation led to the
1934 Water Code.135
The 1934 law represented a significant shift toward the public
trust approach even while maintaining the right of private ownership.136
Private rights were exclusive to springs within private property or to
water bodies located entirely within or underneath a property’s boundaries.137 However, Brazil’s size and historical settlement policies that
favored awarding vast tracts of land to individuals meant that there were
many very large private estates.138 It was not uncommon for a water body

132

See POMPEU, supra note 107, at 149 (describing the Brazilian water legal regime based
on prior appropriation before and under the 1824 Brazilian Constitution).
133
See id.
134
See Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation in the
Atlantic Forest of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA: BIODIVERSITY
STATUS, THREATS, & OUTLOOK 103, 104 (Carlos Galindo-Leal & Ibsen de Gusmão Câmara
eds., 2003) (providing a useful parallel on how cycles of demographic pressure linked to
land occupation policies have a negative impact on natural resources exploitation).
135
See Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2191 (drawing the parallel between Brazil’s
energy needs and the Decree no. 24,643, July 10, 1934 instituting the Water Code).
136
See id.
The Water Code promulgated in 1934 by Getúlio Vargas gave water its
own legal regime and revoked the treatment of water in the Civil Code.
In a country that industrialized rapidly and whose cities grew
suddenly, it is no surprise that the Code departed from the historical
tradition of emphasis on agriculture and navigation by adopting an
industrial vision of water. Id.
137
See Decreto No. 24.643, de 10 Julho de 1934, D.O.U. art. 8, de 10.7.1934 (Braz.),
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/ D24643.htm [hereinafter 1934
Water Code].
138
See LAURA BECK VARELA, DAS SEMSMARIAS À PROPRIEDADE MODERNA: UM ESTUDO DE
HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [FROM SESMARIAS TO MODERN PROPERTY: A STUDY OF
THE HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN LAW] 108 (Renovar, 2005) (Braz.) (describing a chaotic land
acquisition process impregnated into historical Brazilian settlement policies); see also
Daibert, supra note 117, 796–97 (2009) for a brief description on how land was claimed
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to reside solely within the boundaries of a private holding (indeed, in
some regions of the country this remains true). Thus, under the 1934 law,
large bodies of water remained in private hands, a status that fully
comported with the precepts of the pre-1988 constitutions.139
2.

The Law’s Progression Toward Classifying Water as an Asset
of Common Use

Water policies predicated solely on navigability became problematic when Brazil began industrializing in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.140 The energy needs created by growing industrial
demand directed the nation’s attention toward the country’s enormous
hydroelectric potential. This shift in national priorities is reflected in the
1934 Code, which devotes an entire section to the regulation of the
hydroelectric industry.141

under most of Portuguese ruling by squatters who
were free people who occupied any unclaimed land. The practice was
illegal, though tolerated through the custom of posse (possession).
Depending on the way the right of possession was acquired and
exercised, a sesmaria could be granted to the squatter. This frequently
occurred because of the practical difficulties in following the legal
procedures to obtain a regular sesmaria, the granting of which did not
depend on merit-based criteria but was rather a privilege of those who
had the greatest number of slaves to produce exportable goods. As
demand for land increased, property ownership became a matter of who
had more power and influence. A sesmeiro thus needed no only to be
white and Christian, but powerful.
This settlement policy:
would remain in place for a long time accompanied by its primary
distinguishing feature—the gigantic size of tracts of land that were
customarily granted to sesmeiros—which resulted in latifúndios (from
the Latin, latifundium: latus = broad + fundus = landed estate). This
phenomenon has had far-reaching effects on Brazilian society and the
environment. Id.
139
See Pompeu, supra note 107, at 161–211 (providing a thorough assessment of the provisions
in the 1934 Water Code that are still valid in light of the 1988 Constitutional regime).
140
See Filipe Domingos Commetti et al., O Desenvolvimento do Direito das Águas Como
Um Ramo Autônomo da Ciência Jurídica Brasileira, 51 REVISTA DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL
[ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL] 45, 80 (2008) (referring to a shift in the economy in the
beginning of the twentieth century from an agrarian-based to a more industrialized one,
requiring in turn more energy to sustain that switch).
141
See 1934 Water Code, supra note 137, art. 139–144. This section was updated in 1941,
reflecting the importance of water resources for Brazil to meet its growing energy
demands. See Decreto-Lei No. 3.763, de 25 Octubro de 1941, D.O.U. de 25.10.1941 (Braz.),
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The focus on growing energy demands obscured growing demographic and socioeconomic pressures.142 During most of the 1900s, Brazil
faced rapid and uncontrolled urban growth.143 The increasingly industrialized economy drove people to the cities in search of jobs.144 This concentration of population and industry created significant water allocation and
quality problems which the law was slow to address.145
The pre-1988 navigability and hydroelectric water regimes started
to change with the 1965 Forest Code.146 This statute, amended and
strengthened by Law 7,803 of 1989,147 protected areas riparian148 to
rivers, lakes and springs throughout Brazil.149 In succeeding years,
growing international and national concern with environmental issues
compelled the government to enact sweeping legislation. The 1972
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/1937-1946/Del3763.htm
#art144c.
142
See Edésio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16 SOC. AND
LEGAL STUDIES 201, 202–03 (2007), available at http://sls.sagepub.com/cgi/content/
abstract/16/2/201.
As a result of a process of rapid urbanization in the past four decades,
Latin America is the most urbanized region of the developing world,
with over 75 per cent [sic] of the population living in urban areas; in
Brazil, 83 per cent [sic] of the total population lives in cities. The socioeconomic development model that has required rapid urbanization in
the region has produced cities heavily marked by the presence of
precarious peripheral areas. Despite the many existing differences in
the processes of urban development verified in the region, generally
speaking, urbanization has brought about combined processes of social
exclusion, spatial segregation, and environmental degradation. Id.
143
See Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1 (1988).
144
See id. at 1, 54.
145
See id. at 1 (noting that uncontrolled urban growth in Brazil resulted in water pollution and, consequently, impairment of public water supplies).
146
See Commetti et al., supra note 140, at 88 (noting that the 1965 Forest Code protects
water resources indirectly by providing for permanently protected areas, constituting
those riparian to rivers, lakes, and springs).
147
See Lei No. 7.803, de 18 de Julho de 1989, D.O.U. de 18.7.1989 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L7803.htm.
148
While “riparian” technically refers to land along the banks of rivers (or owners thereof),
we use it here to refer to land bordering any freshwater source and to those who own
such land.
149
See Lei No. 4.771, de 15 Setembro de 1965, D.O.U. art. 2, de 16.9.1965 (Braz.),
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L4771.htm; see also Colin Crawford
& Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges of Protecting
Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding “The Law That Sticks,” 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1,
23–25 (2007) (describing the permanently preserved forested areas in the 1965 Brazilian
Forest Code).
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Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment150 was particularly
influential in Brazil.151
The landmark statute of this environmental phase in Brazil is the
1981 National Environmental Policy Act.152 With the subsequent enactment
of the 1988 Constitution,153 followed by the 1997 National Water Management Act and the 1998 Environmental Crimes Law,154 water management
became entirely the province of the federal and state governments.155
C.

Water Law in the Post-1988 Constitutional Regime

The legal underpinning for the new water regime lies in the 1988
Constitution’s declaration that the environment “is an asset of common
use and essential to a healthy quality of life.”156 Water, as part of the
150

See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June
5–16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 21, U.N. Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972).
151
See Findley, supra note 143, at 2. Findley notes that after the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment,
Brazilians have begun to realize that protection of the environment
may be in their own interest. Popular environmental movements and
organizations have arisen. In addition, a substantial body of regulatory
law has been adopted, and public agencies with authority to implement
the law have been created at the federal, state, and local levels. Id.
152
See Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, D.O.U. de 2.9.1981 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6938.htm.
153
See Vladimir Passos de Freitas, A Tutela Civil das Águas 129, 131–33 [The Civil Law
of Water], in ÁGUAS ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS [WATER LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS] (Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Coord., Juruá, 2002) (BRAZ.) (examining the
relationship between the environmental legal regime and water policies).
154
See Marcelo Malucelli, A Tutela Penal das Águas 147, 152–56 [The Criminal Law of
Water], in ÁGUAS ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS [WATER LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASPECTS] (Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Coord., Juruá, 2002) (BRAZ.) (analyzing the 1998
Environmental Crimes Law as part of the water legal framework).
155
José Ribeiro, Propriedade das Águas e o Registro de Imóveis 29, 35–42 [Property over
Water and Property Registry], in ÁGUAS ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS [WATER
LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS] (Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Coord., Juruá, 2002)
(BRAZ.) (describing the shift in approach before and after the 1988 Constitution from the
notion of water as a renewable and unlimited resource to a renewable and limited resource
that shall be managed for the public benefit).
156
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.) (“All have the right to
an ecologically balanced environment, which is an asset of common use and essential to
a healthy quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall have the
duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations.”). For an unofficial
English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see Brazil: 1988 Constitution with
1996 Reforms, supra note 109.

396

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 35:371

environment, is covered by this principle as well.157 Codifying statutes
soon followed. For example, Article 99 of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code
specifically states that rivers and oceans are public assets of common
use158 and Article 1 of the National Water Policy Act declares that water
lies within the public domain.159 This powerful statutory combination
replaced centuries of governmental indifference and lack of recognition of
looming issues of water scarcity.160
Along with the extension of public domain over water, the post1988 Constitutional water regime enhanced the 1981 National Environmental Policy Act.161 Among other relevant provisions, it requires the
government to “preserve and restore . . . essential ecological processes and
ecosystems,” “preserve the diversity and integrity of the genetic patrimony
of the country,”162 oversee “entities engaged in research and manipulation
of genetic material,”163 identify and protect areas of special environmental
significance,164 and to protect fauna and flora.165 These principles, all of
which are broadly relevant to water policy, were further buttressed by the
1997 National Water Management Act.
The National Water Management Act specifically declares water
a limited natural resource endowed with economic value166 and requires
that in shortage situations priority uses be those relating to human consumption and to animals.167 It further states that water policies should
facilitate multiple uses168 and that local management authority should reside with river basin committees.169 The language of the statute codified
157

See Passos de Freitas, supra note 153, at 131 (relating water policies to the
environmental legal framework).
158
C.C. art. 99 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/
L10406.htm.
159
Lei No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 1, I.
160
See Commetti et al., supra note 140, at 85 (noting the shift in paradigms towards
water throughout the twentieth century).
161
Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, D.O.U. de 2.9.1981 (Braz.), available at http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6938.htm.
162
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225, para. 1, 1–2 (Braz.).
163
Id. at art. 225, para. 1, 2.
164
Id. at art. 225, para. 1, 3.
165
Id. at art. 225, para. 1, 7.
166
Lei No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 1, II.
167
Id. at art. 1, III. This prioritization raises interesting questions of law (i.e., what
exactly is a prioritized animal use?) that we will be exploring in a subsequent essay.
168
Id. at art. 1, IV.
169
Id. at art. 1, V. & VI.; see also Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2201 (“The
committees are responsible for decisions about the use of water resources in their
designated basins.”). A lengthy discussion of the role of river basin committees is beyond
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into law the hortatory principles articulated in the Constitution. Specifically, it is the legislative response to the constitutional provision mandating the creation and management of the national water legal regime.170
While these new constitutional and regulatory principles represented a dramatic policy shift, they also raised significant challenges
of implementation.171 The following sections examine some of those
challenges.
1.

Public Domain Over Waters (Groundwater and the Issue of
Takings)

Article 20, 3 and Article 26, 1 of the 1988 Constitution entrust the
federal government with managing lakes, rivers, and watercourses on
lands within its domain that wash more than one state, and that serve
as boundaries with other countries.172 It also extends jurisdiction over
beaches and the territorial sea.173 Article 26, 1 also significantly expands
the number of water bodies entrusted to the various states, granting them
sovereignty over most surface waters that do not pertain to the federal
government.174 Private water rights were abrogated, including rights
over groundwater.175
While the 1988 Constitution did not specifically address groundwater, the public ownership regime applied to all of Brazil’s water, a
designation that includes groundwater.176 Some still-valid 1934 Water
the purview of this study. However, their role in allocation, quality control, and management is significant and growing.
170
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 21, 19 (Braz.).
171
See McNallen, supra note 4, at 176. McNallen argues that
[t]he transfer of ownership from the private to the public sphere in 1988
had little to no effect. The federal and state governments did not curtail
the use of its water at that time. The ramifications of this change will
likely be felt in the future, if and when Brazil elects to enforce its rights
as owner and deny or restrict use of water resources. Id.
See also Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2201 (referring to implementation struggles
regarding water basin committees and that “[t]his delay in establishing water basin
committees demonstrates that, despite the legal advances envisioned by the National
Water Act, it is at the institutional level that the new system’s effectiveness will
be tested.”).
172
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20, 4 & 6 (Braz.).
173
Id.
174
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 26, 1 (Braz.).
175
See POMPEU, supra note 107, at 218
176
See id. (noting that the groundwater provisions in the 1934 Water Code were revoked
by mining law, the 1988 Constitution, and the 2002 Civil Code).
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Code provisions177 as well as the 2002 Civil Code section dealing with
groundwater178 must therefore be construed in light of the governing
constitutional principles and the National Water Act.179 This abrupt change
in the law meant that much privately held water was expropriated into
the public domain, which raised takings issues.
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution contains a takings provision
similar in many respects to that of the United States.180 While some
scholars argue that the private water ownership provisions under the 1934
Act were not revoked by the 1988 Constitution,181 most agree that the
water rights were in fact expropriated.182 The issue then becomes whether
the owners are entitled to compensation.183
Interestingly, there have not been many takings claims brought
on this issue. This may be in part due to Brazil’s water abundance (which
means that the expropriated water held little monetary value) and also a
lack of enforcement.184 Property owners who have springs or wells on
their property have not yet felt the impact of the nationalization of their
water.185 However, as water shortages grow and enforcement spreads,
litigation will almost certainly follow.
One example of a brewing conflict lies in the state of Mato Grosso
do Sul, where the passage of Resolution 8 in July 2009 empowers the
state Environmental Authority to require permits for property owners

177

1934 Water Code, supra note 137, art. 96–101.
C.C. art. 98–103 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/
L10406.htm.
179
See Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2207–08 (“Although the 1934 Water Code
contains an entire title on groundwater, it should be read in conjunction with the 1988
Federal Constitution and the National Water Act. Likewise, the new Civil Code of
2002, which also addresses groundwater, should be read in conjunction with these two
enactments.”).
180
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, 24 (Braz.).
181
See, e.g., JOSÉ DOS SANTOS CARVALHO FILHO, MANUAL DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO
1024 [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MANUAL] (Lumen Júris, 17th ed., 2007) (Braz.).
182
José Ribeiro, Propriedade das Águas e o Registro de Imóveis [Property over Water and
Property Registry], in ÁGUAS ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS [WATER LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS] 29, 42 (Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Coord., Juruá, 2002)
(Braz.).
183
See id. at 42-43 (understanding that those private owners are entitled to compensation
according to art. 5, 22 of the 1988 Constitution, while also recognizing this is not a settled
issue among Brazilian scholars). See PAULO AFFONSO LEME MACHADO, DIREITO AMBIENTAL
BRASILEIRO [BRAZILIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 446 (Malheiros 16th ed., 2008).
184
See infra parts II.D and III.B.
185
See Ribeiro, supra note 182.
178
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seeking to operate wells on their land.186 As the agency begins rationing
permits to prevent groundwater overdraft, property owners whose titles
predate the 1988 Constitution may file takings claims.
The argument against compensating those whose water rights
were expropriated lies within Article 8 of the Water Code.187 Article 8
states that water can be privately held but that ownership is conditional
on the waters not being declared assets of common use.188 As the 1988
Constitution, Article 99 of the 2002 Civil Code189 and the 1997 Water
Policy Act190 all declared water to fall under the category of common use,
claims for compensation become murkier.191 The argument against compensation aligns with what Joseph Sax calls an “economy of nature,”192
186

Resolução Semac No. 08, de 6 de Julho de 2009, arts. 1 & 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO ESTADO
7.7.2009 (Braz.), available at http://www.imasul.ms.gov.br/
legislacao/Resolucoes/docs/RESOLUÇÃO%20SEMAC%20n.%2008-09%20(POÇO)
%20consolidada.doc.
187
1934 Water Code, supra note 137, art. 8.
188
Id.
189
C.C. art. 99, I. (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/
L10406.htm.
190
Lei No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 1, I.
191
As in the United States, fact patterns for takings claims can get quite complex. For
example, when one landowner sued an oil company over rights to the water found when
the oil company drilled a well in search of oil, the court denied his claim. S.T.J.-9, No.
2003/0048439-9, Relator: Exmo. Luiz Fux, D.O.U. de 3.2.2004 (Braz.). The Superior Court
of Justice held that the 1988 Constitution and the 1997 Water Act had revoked the 1934
Water Code private water provisions. Id. Therefore, the Court denied the plaintiff’s claim
on the grounds that he would only be entitled to compensation if he had a permit to use
the water. Id.
192
See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (1993).
Viewing land through the lens of nature’s economy reduces the significance of property lines. Thus a wetland would be an adjunct of a
river, in service to the river as a natural resource. Beach dune land would
be the frontal region of a coastal ecosystem extending far beyond the
beach itself. A forest would be a habitat for birds and wildlife, rather
than simply a discrete tract of land containing the commodity timber.
Under such a view the landowner cannot justify development by simply
internalizing the effect of such development on other properties.
Rather, the landowner’s desire to do anything at all creates a problem,
because any development affects the delicate ecosystem which the
untouched land supports. In an economy of nature the landowner’s role
is perforce custodial at the outset, before the owner ever transforms
the land. Moreover, the object of the custody generally extends beyond
the owner’s legally defined dominion. The notion that land is solely the
owner’s property, to develop as the owner pleases, is unacceptable. Id.
DE MATO GROSSO DO SUL de
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wherein the state can and should encourage adaptive behavior. Compensating those who do not conform to ecological realities does not serve the
larger purpose of encouraging societal migration toward a sustainable
property regime, nor does it offer any benefit to individuals who are more
sensitive to changes and able to foresee indispensable regulatory intervention.193 Therefore, there is little social utility to a statutory entitlement
to compensation under such circumstances. Nevertheless, neither Sax’s
nor the Brazilian government’s approach directly addresses the inequity
befalling individuals caught up in the transition to an economy of nature
from a private property regime.194
2.

Water as a Limited Natural Resource Endowed With Economic
Value

The post-1988 water regime shifts from a policy that paid scant
attention to water and viewed it as an unlimited, valueless resource to a
management strategy that treats water as precious, vital, and finite.
With the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, the user-pays/polluterpays principles were enshrined as pillars of Brazilian water policy.195
This shift had tremendous implications for Brazilian water law. However, it has not yet been fully enforced.
Despite an impressive set of laws and policies, the pace of implementing the modern water regime remains a challenge. Under the 1997
Water Policy Act, it is incumbent upon River Basin Committees to determine who will be charged for water use and how much those users will
pay.196 Yet, after twelve years with this policy in place, only 141 State
and 8 Interstate River Basin Committees have been formed.197 Out of those,
only twelve State and two Interstate River Basin Committees have effec-

193

See id. at 1449.
See id. Sax does suggest several mitigating measures governments could take, including
exempting already developed lands from the new rules, allowing variances for hardships,
gradual phase-in of new regulations, and exempting individual homesites from subdivision regulations. Id. at 1451.
195
The charge for water uses is conditional upon the establishment of river basin committees. See Lei No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 38, VI.
196
Id.
197
See AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE ÁGUAS, A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA COBRANÇA PELO USO DE
RECURSOS HÍDRICOS E AGÊNCIA DE ÁGUA DAS BACIAS DOS RIOS PIRACICABA, CAPIVARI E
JUNDIAÍ [THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER USE CHARGES AND WATER AGENCY IN THE PCJ
RIVER BASINS]42 (December 2009), available at http://www.ana.gov.br/CobrancaUso/
_docs/Implementacao_PCJ_PORTeING.pdf
194
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tively instituted a system for charging for water use.198 When one considers Brazil’s size (nearly that of the continental United States199), these
data clearly demonstrate the gap between policy and implementation
that plagues Brazilian water law (and Brazil’s environmental law in
general).
3.

The National Water Management System (Law 9,433/97) and
its Fundamental Principles

The chief implementing statute in the Brazilian water regime is
Law No. 9.433, known as the National Water Management System.200 It
aims to 1) preserve water quality and quantity for, 2) present and future generations, and 3) protect the resource against critical hydrological
events.201 Lawmakers recognized that sustainable development required
a syncretic water policy that allowed for multiple uses including transportation.202 They also knew that sound management dictated precaution
and planning for critical hydrological events, whether natural or anthropogenic in origin.203
The multiuse principle, even when not directly articulated in a
given statute, underlies all contemporary Brazilian water law.204 According
to this principle, no use shall be prioritized to the detriment or exclusion of
another.205 In addition, water bodies are grouped into categories based on
prevailing uses determined by the Federal Environmental Deliberative
Council (“CONAMA”).206 The aim is to ensure water quality is compatible
198

See National Water Agency—Brazil [hereinafter ANA], Cobranca Pelo Uso de Recurso
Hidricos, http://www.ana.gov.br/CobrancaUso/default2.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
199
See Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Area, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html
?countryName=Brazil&countryCode=br&regionCode=sa&rank=5#br (last visited Nov. 6,
2010).
200
Lei. No. 9.433, supra note 111.
201
Id.; see also Benjamin et al., supra note 119, at 2199 (“The heart of federal legislation
applicable to water is the Lei da Politica nacional de Recursos Hidricos (National Water
Act) of January 8, 1997, the substance of which was strongly influenced by European law.”).
202
Lei. No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 2, II.
203
Id. at art. 2, III.
204
The principle of multiuse is reflected in the sole paragraph of article 13 of the Law
9,433/97. See id. art. 13.
205
See id. at art. 11–18.
206
See id. at art. 9–10. See generally Luiz Fernando Henry Sant’Anna, General Overview
of Brazilian Environmental Law, 15SPG INT’L L. PRACTICUM 22, 22 (2002).
National Environmental Council or ‘CONAMA’ [Conselho Nacional
do Meio Ambiente]—The main objective of CONAMA, which is the
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with use patterns, make efficient use of public funds, and to design water
pollution strategies that suit prevailing uses.207
4.

The Post-1988 Permitting System

One major component of the post-1988 water management regime
is the provision governing the awarding of rights to water resources.208
This administrative permit system is broadly comparable to that of the
United States. The underlying premise is that water is a vital and limited
resource held in trust for the common good.209 Its use shall be subject to
governmental award.210 However, the government cannot award a possessory right; permits only guarantee the right of use.211
Brazil requires permits for any action that could significantly affect
quantity or quality of water.212 The policy justification for the permits is
threefold. First, the National Water Management Act classifies water as
a limited resource endowed with economic value.213 Second, the Act envisions the creation of conservation incentives that will shape and guide
water use.214 Finally, revenues generated by the permit system will be
used to finance water management projects as well as the administrative
costs of the system.215 In the interest of equity, the 1997 law specifically
exempted water needs of small communities in rural areas, insignificant
uptake, siphoning-off and discharges, and insignificant accumulations of
water volumes.216 Nevertheless, despite these clearly laid out statutory

National Council for the Environment, is to deliberate, within the scope
of its competence, about rules and standards that are essential to public
health and safety and that are compatible with an ecologically balanced
environment, and to support, study, and propose to the Ministry of the
Environment . . . governmental policy relating to the environment and
natural resources. Id.
207
See Lei. No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 9.
208
See id. at art. 11–18.
209
See id. at art. 11–12.
210
See id. at art. 12–14.
211
See generally id. at art. 11–18 (describing government award of rights of use). As in the
United States, possession of de minimis amounts of water is possible and common (e.g.,
bottled water).
212
See id. at art. 11–12.
213
Lei. No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 11–12.
214
See id. at art. 19.
215
See id. at art. 22.
216
Id. at art. 12.
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directives as well as substantial penalties for disobeying the law,217 the
government’s ability to protect watersheds and ensure equitable access
to water for the Brazilian citizenry remains in question.
D.

From Abundance to Emerging Water Poverty in Brazil

Although Brazil is water-rich, the water is not distributed evenly
throughout the country.218 Seventy-five percent of the country’s surface
water is concentrated in northern Brazil, home to the Amazon rainforest and the country’s least populated region.219 By contrast, the Southeast—the most populated and industrialized region—contains only ten
percent of the country’s water.220
However, despite the country’s biggest cities (São Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, etc.), largest population,
and highest levels of industrialization residing in the South and Southeast of Brazil, that region’s freshwater remains relatively plentiful.221
The problem lies with how water availability is defined. If fresh water
availability means sufficient potable water to fulfill human and animal
vital needs, then water availability is a challenge for the entire country,
including the Southeast.222 These shortages arise in large part from
decades of unplanned industrial development.223 In addition, municipal
217

Penalties range from warnings to fines and imprisonment. See id. at art. 49–50.
See infra notes 219–20. For a map of the urban demographic distribution in Brazil, see
THE BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND STATISTICS [IBGE], available at http://
www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/atlas/pag034.pdf.
219
Rosa M. F. Johnsson & Karin E. Kemper, Institutional And Policy Analysis Of River
Basin Management: The Alto-Tiete River Basin, São Paulo, Brazil 8 (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3650, 2005), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/06/16/000016406_20050616092016/
Rendered/PDF/wps3650.pdf.
220
Id.; Água [Water], in ALMANAQUE BRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 291, 292 (Beto Ricardo &
Maura Campanili eds., 2008).
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See Johnsson & Kemper, supra note 219, at 8.
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Jan. 22, 2011) (excerpted from ALEXANDRA DE VRIES & SHAWN BLORE, FROMMER’S BRAZIL
(5th ed. 2010)); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR WATER REUSE
258–60 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/625r04108/
625r04108chap8.pdf.
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See Roberta M. Delson & John P. Dickenson, Perspectives on Landscape Change in
Brazil, 16 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 101, 114 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/
157289 (“A major feature, therefore, of twentieth-century change has been the
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supply chains waste between forty and sixty percent of the water they
draw.224 Inevitably, these factors combine to create scarcity and expensive clean water.
Recurrent water shortages in a country that is home to an estimated ten percent of the world’s freshwater is a clear signal that implementing Brazil’s environmental laws has proven more of a challenge
than enacting its innovative legal framework. Furthermore, population
and climate pressures are growing. In 2001, Brazil faced a major drought
that jeopardized the country’s energy supply and imposed severe caps on
industrial and domestic electricity uses.225 Long periods of drought are
becoming more frequent, even in wet states in the South like Paraná and
Rio Grande do Sul.226 A major diversion project aimed at diverting water
from the San Francisco River for the arid northeast region of Brazil offers
another example of how water management policies, in a country known
for its water abundance, must now focus on avoiding water shortages.227

introduction of factories, chimneys, dirt, pollution and other signs of ‘progress’ into the
Brazilian scene.”); Findley, supra note 143, at 31–37 (detailing major recent water
pollution incidents in southeastern Brazil).
224
See Aldo da C. Rebouças, Água no Brasil: Abundância, Desperdício e Escassez [Water
in Brazil: Abundance, Waste and Scarcity], 13 BAHIA ANÁLISE & DADOS 341, 342 (2003),
available at http://www.icb.ufmg.br/big/benthos/index_arquivos/pdfs_pagina/Minicurso/
pag_341.pdf; see also TERESA WAGNER, U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, BRAZIL: OVERVIEW OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR IN BRAZIL (2008), available at http://www.buyusa.gov/
environmental/99.doc; Francesca McCann, Government Commitment Around the Globe
to Improving Water and Sanitation Infrastructure and Countering Water Loss, WATER
UTIL. INFRASTRUCTURE MGMT. (Jun. 1, 2008), http://www.uimonline.com/index/webapp
-stories-action?id=138&archive=yes&Issue=2008-06-01.
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Venkataraman Krishnaswamy & Gary Stuggins, Closing the Electricity SupplyDemand Gap 48–50 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 39741), available at http://www
-wds.worldbank.org/ (enter 39741 in search box).
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See, e.g., Carlos Caminada & Carla Simoes, Brazil Drought Threatens 10 Million Tons
of Corn, Soy, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
21070001&sid=a7Ks4iGegt8o.
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See Julie McCarthy, Brazil River Dispute Highlights Larger Issue, NPR (Aug. 29,
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14004755. See generally
Transposição do Rio São Francisco [San Francisco River Diversion Project], FUNDAÇÃO
JOAQUIM NABUCO, http://www.fundaj.gov.br/docs/tropico/desat/fran.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2011) (containing detailed information regarding the San Francisco River
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CLIMATE CHANGE: IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL MODEL FOR EMERGING
WATER POVERTY

According to the International Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”),
there is “high confidence” that the western United States and northeastern Brazil “will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate
change.”228 It projects significant adverse impacts on agriculture, water
supply, energy production and health.229 While dry regions will become
drier, there will also be changes in rainfall patterns and runoff in traditionally humid zones that will increase floods.230 This will impact water
availability and quality and present “challenges to society [and] physical
infrastructure.”231 These projections, which apply to both countries, are
already visible in southeastern Brazil as well as in many regions of the
United States.232
The climatic shifts and accompanying infrastructural stresses
present significant challenges to the water laws of both Brazil and the
United States. Neither system has shown itself sufficiently flexible or
adaptive to dramatic environmental changes. Brazil has implemented a
national climate change policy at the end of 2009 that highlights the
need to manage natural resources in light of the risks posed by climate
change.233 However, the policy provisions merely offer guidelines rather
than any specific plan of action. Specific regulatory measures were left
to the executive branch to enact and also delegated to the various states
and municipalities.234
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Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz, Luis J. Mata et al., Freshwater Resources and Their
Management, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 175 (Martin Parry et al., eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter3.pdf.
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IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 125, at 49.
230
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232
See, e.g., Tom Watkins, Northeast Flooding Sets Record, CNN.COM (Mar. 30, 2010, 2:47
PM EDT), available at http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/weather/03/30/northeast.flood.fears/
index.html (detailing recent rain events in northeastern United States that caused
extensive property damage); Brazil Death Toll Rises to 224, REUTERS, (Apr. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN12106727 (detailing the devastation
in Rio de Janeiro resulting from severe rainfall).
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See Lei No. 12.187, de 29 de Decembro de 2009, D.O.U. de 30.12.2009 (Braz.), available
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http://preventionweb .net/go/12488 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
234
The Federal Government enjoys concurrent authority with States and Municipal
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Brazil is already struggling with the implementation of the post1988 water regime.235 Incorporating the guidelines of the new climate
change policy act into existing water law will present significant new
challenges. For example, the current overdependence on hydroelectricity
and the lack of enforcement of water management and allocation provisions cannot be sustained.236
In the United States, the situation is even more dire. There is, as
yet, no consensus at the governmental level regarding the existence of
climate change or the need for a comprehensive national response.237
Some states have taken action either individually or in tandem with
other states,238 but this piecemeal response cannot substitute for broad
federal action. While the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA has galvanized the EPA to begin regulating carbon emissions
under the Clean Air Act239 and the agency has taken some tentative steps
toward using the Clean Water Act,240 these measures are aimed at
reducing carbon emissions rather than adapting to the changing climate.
The same could be said for the various bills examined in the 111th Congress.241 Consequently, any legal adaptive strategy in the United States

Governments to legislate over environmental matters and common authority to control
pollution related problems. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 23, 6-7
& 24, 6 (Braz.).
235
See supra Part II.C.
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See Krishnaswamy & Stuggins, supra note 225, at 43–44; see also infra Part III.B.
237
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climatechange/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (explaining the evidence of climate change and
the government’s proposed solutions) with Jonathan Karl and Z. Byron Wolf, Amid Heat
Wave, Senator Talks ‘Global Cooling,’ ABC NEWS (July 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go
.com/Politics/amid-heat-wave-senator-talks-global-cooling/story?id= 11237381 (quoting
the second-ranking Senator on the Environment and Public Works Committee as stating
“[w]e’re in a cycle now that all the scientists agree is going into a cooling period.”).
238
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CLIMATE CHANGE: 50 STATE SURVEY POSTED MARCH 2010 REFLECTING DEVELOPMENTS
FROM MAY 2009–OCTOBER 2009, available at http://www.abanet.org/abapubs/
globalclimate/docs/50States_Survey_ThruNov09final.pdf.
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See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–35 (2007). See generally Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (containing statutory provisions designed to address air
pollution issues).
240
Les Blumenthal, EPA May Try to Use Clean Water Act to Regulate Carbon Dioxide,
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(updated
Nov.
24,
2010),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/04/v-print/91486/clean-water-act-might-be
-used.html. See generally Fed. Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
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will almost certainly be reactive rather than proactive and will face
additional challenges as a result.
Given the looming challenges presented by climate change, both
the United States and Brazil must determine whether their respective
systems of water law are adequate to the task ahead and/or whether they
can sufficiently adapt to the changed environment. We believe that the
answer in both cases is no. We further believe that this lack of readiness
poses a grave threat to each country’s national security.
A.

United States Water Law is Unequal to the Task

One prominent Brazilian scholar has pointed to the water law of
the western United States as a model for other nations to follow. According to Édis Milaré, the United States has one of the most advanced water
policies in the world due to its promotion of rational use.242 In his view,
the abundant harvests of the Midwest are evidence of sound management strategies.243 We respectfully disagree.
The harvests in the Midwest and the West of the United States
result from groundwater overdraft, massive appropriations of water,
government subsidies, and a willingness to expend enormous amounts
of money and resources to grow water-dependent crops in arid regions.244
The prior appropriation regime privileges users based on priority rather
than on reasonableness of use.245 The requirement that water be used
“beneficially” creates few meaningful restrictions because the term is
defined so broadly as to permit highly consumptive uses regardless of
ecosystemic realities.246 In our view, a rational water policy of the type
described by Milaré must acknowledge geographical constraints and
allow flexibility to adapt to changing ecological realities including those

.pewclimate.org/federal/policy-solutions/climate-policy-memo/major-climate-and
-energy-proposals-111th-congress, (last visited Jan. 22, 2011). But see PEW CENTER ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CONGRESSIONAL BILLS ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION: 111TH CONGRESS (July 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/Federal_Bills _Addressing_Adaptation_080210.pdf.
242
See ÉDIS MILARÉ, DIREITO DO AMBIENTE [THE LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT] 227
(Malheiros Editores 2000) [2005] (Braz.).
243
See id.
244
See Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Roberto H. Abrams, Climate Change and
Freshwater Resources, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 30, 33–35.
245
See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
246
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.

408

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 35:371

presented by climate change. Water policy in the western United States
falls short in both respects.
Riparian water law in the United States is also problematic. It
aggregates water rights in the hands of those few who own land bordering a watercourse.247 However, under the contemporary “regulated riparian” regime wherein permits are apportioned based on reasonableness
of use, the potential exists for the legal regime to adapt and respond to
emerging geographical realities.248 The question for lawmakers and
regulators will be what constitutes a reasonable use.
The United States water regime also faces a regulatory deficit as
it struggles to define reasonable use (in the East) and beneficial use (in
the West). Though most states now use a permitting system to regulate
water use, demand already exceeds supply and that problem will only
grow in coming decades.249 Climate models show that temperatures in
the Western United States are expected to rise between two and five
degrees Celsius.250 This will further dry the air in this already arid region,
decreasing humidity and precipitation. This decrease in precipitation will
diminish snowpack, lessen surfacewater flow, and decrease aquifer
recharge; this combination will mean significantly less water for both
human and nonhuman uses.251
In the comparatively humid Eastern United States, problems also
loom. As sea levels rise (due to melting of polar ice and thermal expansion of the oceans), saltwater will intrude inland into deltas and coastal
aquifers.252 Salinity problems will increase during times of highest water
demand and, as freshwater levels drop, seawater intrusion will increase
still more.253 Even the Great Lakes and surrounding region are forecast
to experience dramatic impacts.254 Levels in Lake Huron and Michigan
may drop as much as 1.38 meters and will lose most of their winter ice
cover (causing increased evaporation).255 Overall, both stream runoff and
247
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248
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10.1175/BAMS-86-1-39.
251
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baseflow (groundwater contributing to streamflow) may drop by as much
as twenty percent by 2030.256 The impact of these shifts on both the
ecosystem and the economy will be dramatic.
Traditionally, the United States’ approach to water shortages has
involved creating large scale diversionary projects to bring water wherever it was needed.257 In recent years, the unsustainability of this approach has become evident, but no workable replacement has yet
emerged. If effective conservation measures are not built into water
policies in both the West and the East, the energy demanded by efforts
to sustain the traditional approach will fuel the same vicious cycle of
energy expenditure to mitigate problems created by energy expenditure
that is faced by Brazil. That cycle will also exacerbate water scarcity.
Breaking the cycle in the United States will require a multifaceted solution. First, it will involve conforming existing regulations to the
new methodologies demanded by a nation facing a changed environment.
Those methodologies include the precautionary approach,
intergenerational equity, valuing ecosystem services, and promoting
water conservation policies. As already mentioned, many of those principles and methodologies already exist in Brazilian law. Second, there
must be a considered reevaluation at both the statutory and judicial level
of the definitions and application of the terms “reasonable” and “beneficial.” Neither term yet accounts for the realities of perpetual shortage
and ever-increasing demand. Third, the enforcement model must adapt
to emergent political and ecological realities in a manner that ensures
continuing regulatory oversight while withstanding public pressures
similar to those faced by regulators in Brazil.
For many years, the United States has led the world in environmental regulation and enforcement. Today, though its regulatory apparatus has not kept pace with changing realities, the nation’s environmental
enforcement continues to serve as a model worldwide. We suggest that
interweaving some of the principles embedded in the Brazilian legal
framework with United States’ enforcement methods could fashion a
sustainable, post-climate change water regime.
B.

Brazil’s Enforcement Dilemma

In Brazil, the legal regime has evolved considerably in recent
decades. The classification of all waters as a public good, as well as the
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principles embedded in the 1997 National Water Policy Act, demonstrate
an emerging awareness at the governmental level that water management must adapt to modern environmental realities including climate
change.258 Together with the 2009 National Climate Change Policy Act,
principles such as the precautionary approach, intergenerational equity,
multiple use, and risk assessment now infuse the Brazilian water regime.259
The permitting system created by the National Water Management Policy Act is laudably progressive. It gives the permitting authority
significant discretion to incorporate risk assessment methodologies that
include all of the principles mentioned above.260 Hence, Brazil’s challenges lie less with rhetoric than with infrastructure and enforcement.
Brazil derives more than seventy-five percent of its energy from hydroelectricity.261 This infrastructure commitment requires enormous
amounts of water. In a future of increasing temperatures and growing
water scarcity, it is not at all clear from where the water for that energy
will come.262 Furthermore, as growing demographic pressures have
increased competition for this water, the demand for power must now
compete with other vital uses, including domestic consumption, industrial use, and agriculture.263
The country’s dependence on hydroelectricity has created a serious
policy dilemma. As Brazil has begun building more coal-fired power plants
in order to wean the country from hydropower,264 it now confronts the
same problem faced by the United States and many other nations: coal
plants emit enormous amounts of carbon.265 Those emissions accelerate
258
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See Lei No. 9.433, supra note 111, art. 1.; see also Lei No. 12.187, supra note 233.
260
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262
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.powermag.com/distributed_generation/Brazil-Latin-Americas-Beacon_2363 _p4.html.
265
See Global Greenhouse Gas Data, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, available at
259

2011]

WATER LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

411

climate change—the very thing that is driving the looming water shortages. The chief challenge facing policymakers involves figuring out how
to avoid this vicious circle. In Brazil, that challenge includes figuring out
how to enforce the post-1988 legal paradigm shift.
Brazilian water law—like all of Brazilian environmental
law—must address the problem that its statutes are strong, but enforcement is weak.266 This situation is partially due to a lack of resources and
an accompanying lack of political will in the face of competing development priorities.267 In addition, although there is no way to measure it
precisely, corruption remains a factor undermining the enforcement of
environmental laws in Brazil.268
Challenges presented by climate change will further stress an
already weakened enforcement regime. The United States enforcement
mechanism, which mixes command and control with market-based
approaches, may prove a useful model in this regard.269 Although a
recent amendment to the 1981 Brazilian National Environmental Policy
Act allowed for market-based mechanisms to be used as instruments of
environmental policy, those mechanisms remain underutilized.270
In sum, water policies in both Brazil and the United States face
a daunting future. The two countries are respectively strong where the
other is weak. Brazil’s regulatory apparatus has not yet caught up with
its system of laws. The laws, including the National Climate Change
Policy Act as well as the National Water Management Act, provide a
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sound framework upon which to build a regulatory state. The task now
facing the nation involves fashioning an independent regulatory apparatus
that can withstand campaigns to manipulate public opinion and undermine sound policymaking. Sound water policymaking in the post-climate
change world requires acknowledging the principles and guidelines
already in place in Brazilian laws despite the pressures and allures
created by large-scale development projects that fail to account for the
new water-scarce reality.271
CONCLUSION
Even as the legal regimes of Brazil and the United States differ
in many fundamental respects, the challenges they face are the same.
These challenges include bringing the regimes of both countries closer
together. As shortages loom, the notion of water as public good is coming
more clearly into focus for both countries. This means increased regulatory oversight and incorporating progressive management principles into
water policies.
In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution has enabled such a legal framework, yet it lacks enforcement capacity. In the United States, water law
has progressed toward expanded regulatory oversight but remains
constrained by ossified notions of reasonableness and beneficiality. As a
result, it is ill-equipped to deal with the projected consequences of climate change.
As Brazil and the United States struggle to adapt their respective
legal frameworks, they have much to learn from each other. Above all,
both regimes must acknowledge the post-climate change reality and the
legal challenges that it presents. For Brazil, this involves putting its
ideas into practice. For the United States, it involves prodding its current
laws toward a more coherent and sustainable paradigm.

271

See Reese Ewing, Brazil to Flood Amazon Rainforest for Hydroelectric Power,
MONGABAY.COM (Mar. 17, 2006), http://news.mongabay.com/2006/0317-reuters.html
(regarding large scale hydroelectric power plants in the Amazon Rainforest). See
generally NABUCO, supra note 227 (describing the San Francisco River diversion project).

